We Don’t Want to Be Officially Certified! Reasons and Implications of the Participatory Guarantee Systems by Cuéllar-Padilla, Mamen & Ganuza Fernández, Ernesto
sustainability
Article
We Don’t Want to Be Officially Certified! Reasons and
Implications of the Participatory Guarantee Systems
Mamen Cuéllar-Padilla 1,* ID and Ernesto Ganuza-Fernandez 2
1 Agroecology, Food Sovereignty and Commons Research Group, Cordoba University, Sociology Unit,
C5 Building, Campus Universitario Rabanales, Universidad de Cordoba, 14080 Cordoba, Spain
2 Campo santo de los Martires 7, 14004 Cordoba, Spain; eganuza@iesa.csic.es
* Correspondence: mcuellar@uco.es; Tel.: +34-957-212-649
Received: 27 February 2018; Accepted: 28 March 2018; Published: 10 April 2018


Abstract: Official organic regulation in Europe is based on the third-party certification system to
guarantee organic products. Many critics and dissatisfactions have motivated the emergence of other
guarantee systems, based on an intense implication of producers and, in some cases, consumers
and other local actors, involved in localised agri-food systems. They are called Participatory
Guarantee Systems (PGS), and are not recognised as valid guarantee systems by the official organic
regulation. In the present paper, we analyse the main differences between the PGS and the third party
certification system, deepening on their differentiated social and political implications. We conclude
that the procedures behind PGS generate numerous positive impacts in the territories related to
local producers (and consumers) empowerment and localised agri-food systems drive, while their
implications make them not considered as a substitute to third party certification system, unless
certain conditions of social consolidated groups and agroecological and food sovereignty perspective
of food system take place.
Keywords: localised food systems; organic certification; food democratization; food communities
1. Introduction
The European Union (EU) began regulating the organic sector in 1991. Via a series of public
regulations, the production and marketing of organic products were defined, standardised, and subject
to inspection throughout the EU. This process has arisen because organic foods have intrinsic properties
that cannot be discerned by visual inspection or even consumption.
To assure consumers that food has been organically produced, EU organic regulation has
adopted the mechanism of third-party certification. From the beginning, this has been the approach
espoused by the International Organization for Standardization. Third-party certification differs
from other types of certification because it involves an entity that exists outside the agri-food chain.
More specifically, this entity is not involved in processes related to production, transformation,
marketing, or consumption [1–3]. Thus, the third-party certifier is an intermediary who links food
production to food marketing and/or consumption, whose goal is to ensure certain standards are
met along the supply chain. The certification process is based on annual inspections conducted by
qualified technical specialists, who verify that production methods respect the established norms.
On occasion, these inspections are complemented by analyses intended to detect the use of any
prohibited substances.
Under this framework, the certifying body can be either a government agency or a private
company. When a public agency is used, the competent public authority itself is tasked with ensuring
compliance. When a private company is used, it will be accredited by the competent public authority
to properly perform the work. Over the last few decades, food and agricultural certification systems
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have become increasingly privatised [4–7]. Many risks can be identified related to this trend, such as
a lower reliability of the affected sectors. The quality of the guarantee procedure is at stake when the
certification company clients are the own producers it has to evaluate. In addition, the competition for
lower prices directly affect the quality of the farm visits and labour conditions of inspectors, and result
in a competitive market of private companies with a degree of ambiguity and asymmetry in the
agri-food production chain.
A private company that wishes to provide certification services must meet established standards
(ISO/IEC Guide 65), which involves certain limitations and conditions related to their functions.
For example, no certifying body is allowed to provide consulting services or paid advice related to
production regulations. Additionally, the certifying body cannot disseminate any information on the
producers it inspects or their production methods, which means that, in cases of non-compliance,
the specifics of the evaluation are not made public. The consequence of this state of affairs is that
the organic sector displays certain characteristics typical of globalised agri-food systems, namely
a concentration of power and the limited participation of important stakeholders, such as producers
and consumers, in decision-making [8]. Furthermore, the certification process requires a significant
investment on the part of farmers (or the outsourcing of such efforts) and thus entails major additional
costs. Consequently, organic certification has gone from being an initiative instigated by farmers
to distinguish themselves within the agricultural market to a complex procedure involving laws,
standards, accreditation, inspections, contracts, certificates, stamps, and, most especially, significant
commercial interests [9] (p. 4). The result has been additional production costs that penalise small- and
medium-scale farmers and that hurt the consumer’s pocketbook [10]. Furthermore, farm specialization
has been favoured because, from a certification perspective, it is easier to farm monocultures
than diverse crops [11]. In addition to the fact that the framework of the certification system
results in negative incentives because its procedures involve passing judgment on “non-polluters”.
This approach stands in opposition to those taken by other European policies that seek to enhance
ecological sustainability, such as the EU Water Framework Directive (Official Journal of the European
Union 2000), which has adopted the “polluter pays” principle. Questions can also be raised regarding
the certification target. As the system certifies specific products rather than farmers and their general
practices, it encourages organic production to remain a niche market instead of promoting attitudes
that enhance overall sustainability [10]. Likewise, third-party certification discourages the application
of continuous improvement processes, in terms of sustainable practices and designs, associated
with the agroecological transition [12–14]. The logic of an exam, to be passed or failed under fixed
criteria, ultimately stunts sustainability improvement in the organic sector (once you pass it, further
improvements are not encouraged).
However, despite these shortcomings, third-party certification remains the only type of guarantee
system that is recognised by the EU. Other types of guarantee systems exist within the EU and are being
used by farmers who are committed to ecologically sustainable practices, but they are not officially
recognised. That is the case of the so called Participatory Guarantee Systems (PGS) [15]. These
alternative procedures around organic food guarantee invite to us to set out two questions. (1) Why
are these alternative quality assurance systems being actively developed if they are not officially
recognised? (2) How do these unofficial certification systems differ from the official certification system
in their characteristics and political implications?
2. Participatory Guarantee Systems (PGS)
IFOAM (International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements) defines PGS as “locally
focused quality assurance systems that certify producers based on the active participation of
stakeholders and are built on a foundation of trust, social networks, and knowledge exchange” [16].
PGS were inspired by the first-party organic certification systems that were common in the 1970s
and 1980s [17] before the advent of policy-based regulations. In the 1990s, PGS were supplanted by
third-party certification in most of the world. However, PGS remain connected to the ideals of the
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movement’s pioneers [18,19], who defined their practices as “beyond organic” and who had a more
holistic vision of sustainable food systems than the vision manifest in governmental regulations [20].
The underlying principles of PGS differ greatly from those of ISO-established third-party
certification systems. First, there are no independent inspectors who intervene at various time points
between production and consumption. Instead, all stakeholders involved (i.e., producers, consumers,
technicians, and/or any other related parties) jointly define certification standards and help evaluate
compliance. Second, this active participation directly results in transparency, as everybody is aware
of the confidence building process results. The stakeholders are constantly supposed to be aware
of and participate in farm performance, decision-making, and the establishment of standards [9].
Their confidence building procedure must be clearly defined, and all documentation generated by the
guarantee procedure must be universally accessible [21]. Third, quality assurance is framed by local
society and local culture (in terms of both criteria and visions related to food production and in terms
of local actors implied and organizational local structures) [21]. Here, self-management is defined as
producer honesty and respect for nature, health, and consumers. Fourth, horizontality is supposed to
be a pillar, as all stakeholders participate in decision-making, carry out actions, and take responsibility
for assessing the quality of organic products and production processes [9].
In recent years, PGS have increased in popularity, particularly since 2004. That was the year
the first international conference on alternative certification took place in Brazil. By the end of 2014,
there were around 140 PGS registered in 55 countries [15]; Brazil had the most. Indeed, in general,
Latin American countries were the first to develop such systems [20], although some economically
developed countries did so as well. The central role played by Latin America in developing PGS was
not a matter of chance. Under the different regulatory schemes governing organic production in Latin
American countries, PGS were recognised as certification tools and were granted the same status as
third-party certifying bodies (with their accompanying labels). Moreover, the region hosted several
international meetings, such as the Latin American Forum on PGS, held in 2009 and modelled on
the 2004 meeting in Brazil. That conference helped shape PGS in six countries (Brazil, Peru, Bolivia,
Uruguay, Mexico, and Costa Rica). Its objective, in addition to facilitating technical and political
discussions focused on PGS, was to encourage mutual recognition of different systems.
Other PGS-focused international workshops and conferences followed. Among them was the
noteworthy International Conference on Advancing PGS, held in Vietnam in September 2013 [22].
National conferences have also taken place in countries such as China, South Africa, Lao PDR,
the Philippines, Burma, and Spain. In certain countries, such as Mexico [23] and Brazil [24,25],
civil society has actively and successfully lobbied the government to include PGS-based certification in
national regulations related to organic production.
However, a more intriguing topic is the use of PGS in countries that do not legally recognise
them as certification tools. Such is the case for countries belonging to the EU. We suggest that this
trend has important social and political implications because any organic producers who do not obtain
third-party certification will not be officially recognised and will therefore face major limitations as
they seek to develop their businesses, whether in terms of marketing (they will be excluded from
all officially organic certified supply chains, for instance) or in terms of public support (they will be
excluded from public organic food procurement programs, for instance).
3. Methods
To analyse this alternative guarantee systems face to the third party certification, we studied the
case of Spain. In this country, in the last 4 years, two national meetings were self-organised between
2014 and 2016 that focused on the different types of existing autonomous PGS; the goal was to discuss
their experiences and shared challenges, especially related to their unofficial recognition. These two
meetings results are one of the inputs of the present work, whose details are described in Table 1.
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Table 1. Spanish PGS national meetings as inputs for the research.
Meeting Details Participant PGS Research Inputs
I Spanish PGS initiatives meeting.
Valencia, November 2014.
La Reverde Cádiz
Meeting called minutes
SPG—Bo Xarxa Llauradora
Ecovalle—FACPE, Andalucía
A Gavela, Pontevedra
Basherri Sarea, Guipúzcoa
Ecollaures, Valencia
Ecored, Aragón
Vecinos campesinos, Murcia
II Spanish PGS meeting.
Vigo, June 2016.
La Reverde Cádiz
Participating PGS inputs on their
guarantee operating modes
Ecovalle, Granada
FACPE, Andalucía
A Gavela, Pontevedra
EcoRed, Aragón
Vecinos campesinos, Murcia
ASAP Castilla y León
This article was also the result of extensive research and utilised first-hand accounts provided
by different PGS that have been operating in Spain since 2010. In Table 2, we describe the different
PGS studied and the techniques used. As a result of this broad-ranging work, we can describe the
comprehensive framework of these PGS, which offer a clear alternative to the EU’s official system of
organic certification.
Table 2. PGS initiatives studied.
Initiative Name Place Participants Profile Field Work Develop
Asociación de productoras
ecológicas La Balanza Andalusia Producers
Two collective workshops on the
definition of the confidence building
operating mode and the criteria to
be guaranteed. Participatory
observation in two PGS field visits
Ecocarpio Andalusia Producers and consumers
Four collective workshops on the
definition of the confidence building
operating mode and the criteria to
be guaranteed.
Red catalana de Campesinos
agroecológicos—la Xarxeta Catalonia Producers
Twelve semi structured interviews;
three collective workshops on the
definition of the confidence building
operating mode and the criteria to
be guaranteed.
Ecollaures Valence country Producers
Two semi structured interviews;
one collective workshop on the PGS
operating mode
Aiguaclara Valence country Producers and consumers 1 semi structured interview
After the inputs were obtained through this fieldwork and documents reviewed, this study
focused on several key issues. First, we analysed the main differences in the characteristics and
repercussions of PGS versus those of third-party certification by evaluating their key procedures.
Second, we discussed the limitations of PGS, namely the extent to which they provide a true alternative
to third-party certification in the organic sector, by analysing the challenges inherent to the management
methods employed by such guarantee systems. The discussion framework was an analysis on
the political questions and challenges that PGS pose with regards to third-party certification, and,
as a consequence, in relation to official organic production in the EU.
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4. How Participatory Guarantee Systems Work
The basis for PGS is a jointly established definition of the term “organic production” or, in other
words, each PGS decides which criteria it wishes to emphasise in its quality assurance system. This first
step for all PGS is one of the most difficult because it requires a collectively constructed vision of what
is meant by Agroecology or sustainable production (all the PGS studied identify themselves under the
umbrella of Agroecology and Food Sovereignty frameworks). The chosen criteria or standards then
require determining how quality will be assured, namely the verification procedures used to ascertain
that producers, production methods and exchanges are in compliance with PGS-defined standards.
A key characteristic shared by the PGS we studied is the existence of multilevel criteria, that
we can identify in three different levels. First, there are threshold criteria that can be viewed as red
lines that cannot be crossed under any circumstances (e.g., the use of agrochemicals or genetically
modified organisms). Second, regulatory criteria that are also mandatory, but farms are given a time
within which they can adapt their current practices so as to achieve compliance. The PGS we studied
considered that, by establishing this multilevel set of criteria, the guarantee system could work as
a driving force to promote agroecological transition processes [10,14]. This perspective, after PGS
participants, contrasts with that underlying third-party certification, which translate the guarantee
process into a final exam that one passes or fails [11].
Finally, in some cases, the PGS includes a third level representing the “ideal” criteria, which are
treated as desirable practices that will be rewarded with praise and recognition from the members and
the community implied in the PGS (i.e., animal traction and pure local varieties).
The second step is for PGS to define their decision-making procedures. In all cases, the basic
procedure is monthly general assemblies, during which specific tasks are assigned to specific
committees. Committees composition varies across time under a rotation logic. Thanks to rotating
assignments, everyone participates in each of the PGS’ committees at some point in time. This approach
displays horizontality, because anyone can perform any role, regardless of whether it requires more or
less technical training and regardless of the amount of time a person has been member of the PGS.
The third step is to define the quality assurance (also named as confidence building) procedure.
In all cases, collective visits to member farms are a key element. The results of these visits greatly
influence the assessment of producer agroecological practices and overall approaches. However,
and after the participants interviewed, these visits are more than just a means of monitoring production;
they provide a valuable opportunity for peers to learn from each other and exchange experiences as
well as for producers (and consumers when they also take part of the PGS) to engage in discussions.
As remarked in the first PGS meeting, the monitoring process results in collective learning, which is an
added value in comparison to the individual test carried out by an expert in the third party model.
In the two PGS meetings, most of the PGS presented guarantee procedures that utilise two
distinct committees (which means two filters in the confidence building procedure): one that is
responsible for visiting the target farm and a second one that evaluates the report of the visit, taking
also into account past visits reports (e.g., changes in practices and/or the degree of compliance with
past recommendations). After the participants discussions, this double step system pursues several
objectives. First, it reduces the mistakes that could be committed by a single evaluator. Second,
it guarantees a collective process of decision-making and responsibility assumption. Thirdly, it dilutes
conflicts or personal favouritisms effects on the guarantee process. A simplified scheme of a generic
Participatory Guarantee System is displayed in Scheme 1.
The exact names of these committees vary among PGS. The committee responsible for the farm
visits is usually known as the visit group, whereas the one evaluating the visit report is often referred
to as the evaluation committee or the quality-assessment committee.
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Scheme 1. General make-up of a generic PGS.
There are cases, however, in which this double filter is not applied. For example, in small PGS
(such as those found in highly localised areas and that are tied to a small group of producers who have
jointly developed a short supply chain—e.g., La Balanza), the procedure tends to be simplified and
both tasks (the visit and the evaluation of the visit) are carried out by a single committee, which is
made up of all the PGS’ members. Thus, the farm visits, the subsequent evaluations, and the issuance
of the final decision are carried out as part of the PGS’ monthly assemblies. There are also bigger
PGS, in which, with a view to relieving part of the substantial time investment required by members,
the work of the evaluation committee is integrated into the monthly assemblies.
In all cases, the final decision issued by PGS can take two forms. First, it can take a positive tack,
by offering recommendations for improving practices (following the aim of continuous agroecological
transition thrust). Second, it can take a negative tack if: (1) previous recommendations were not
followed without a valid reason; (2) threshold criteria were not met; or (3) transition-related criteria
were not met within the proscribed time frame without an acceptable justification. In such cases,
and depending on the exact results of the evaluation, different penalties may be imposed.
We observed that different penalties were imposed depending upon the degree of a farm’s
non-compliance. The response varied from the PGS lending help to the farmer to expulsion from
the group. Non-compliance has consequences far beyond the imposition of penalties. For instance,
it will also result in the loss of access to a collective localised channel for marketing established by the
group. The greatest penalty is the loss of the social support network, group-based product marketing,
and other associated advantages. The type of decisions that have been identified when evaluating
farm compliance can be seen in Scheme 2.
The last element identified in all the PGS participating in the meetings were similar membership
application procedures. In general, applicants fill out a form in which they evaluate how well
their practices correspond to the PGS’ criteria. The application is then considered by the evaluation
committee, or the committee/structure that serves this function (it can be the monthly assembly as
referred). If the application is approved, then a visit to the applicant’s farm is scheduled. This first visit
is carried out either by the committee responsible for farm visits or by the entire PGS in the specific
cases mentioned above (indeed, in some PGS, even counting on a visit committee, the entire group
participates in the first visit so that all members can meet the applicant and observe his/her production
methods for themselves). From this point forward, the procedure is equivalent to that used during
the annual assessment process, and the basis for the PGS’ recommendations is determined from the
moment official membership begins.
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Scheme 2. PGS decision types when evaluating farms and producers.
5. The Participatory Guarantee System and Third-Party Certification: Two Diametrically
Opposed Approaches
All participants of the PGS that assisted the two meetings, as well as all the key informants,
expressed their rejection of the third party certification. In the cases they were producers and they
combined both systems, the reasons were related to the need of the official label to sell in certain
channels or to access to certain public subsidies, but never as a free option. In the following lines
(Table 3), we analyse the characteristics of the PGS studied and compare them with those of the official
third-party certification system, which allowed us to identify the following key differences and possible
reasons for this rejection.
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Table 3. Main differences between PGS and the official third-party certification system.
Basic Parameters Third Party Certification(Based on the ER834/2007) Participatory Guarantee Systems
Decision making
The decisions on what is evaluated and
how are taken at an institutional level and
by the certification entity or body.
Producers and consumers are passive
actors, non decision from then are required
All the decisions on what, how and when
are taken at the social network level.
Producers and consumers define what they
want it to be and how.
Guarantee responsible/s
Certification bodies or entities (public
administrations or private enterprises).
Always non local technical and
institutional figures.
Local social networks of producers
and consumers
Bureaucracy required
Complex documents designed at technical
bureaus. Public administration and private
enterprises assume the task.
Flexible documents designed by the
networks. Producers and consumers
design how to translate into documents
the principles to be evaluated and
the procedures.
Costs
Expensive mechanism. Costs related to
qualified technical staff (auditors and
managers at the certification body);
costs related to the maintenance of the
certification body structure; costs related to
the travel expenses of the technical
inspectors to the farms
Cheap procedure. The implication of the
members allow to substitute monetary
costs by time, which is not remunerated;
costs related to travel expenses of the visit
group to the farm
Transparency
None. Confidentiality is guaranteed by
law. None of the operators informations
can be published.
Complete. All the members of the
networks know exactly the results of
the proceedings.
Non-conformity consequences The certification is denied. Lost ofcommercialisation opportunities.
The producer is sent off the network.
The person lose not only the guarantee,
but the confidence inside the network
(social consequences). They lose
commercialization channels;
support and mutual aid mechanisms.
Thus, the first key difference is political in nature and relates to the intrinsic distribution of power.
The style of governance used by PGS involves applying radical democracy to the agri-food system [26].
Through mechanisms such as general assemblies involving all the participants every month and
committees where everybody in the initiative participate due to its rotating nature, the participation
of all the people involved in the initiative is, beforehand, guaranteed. In contrast, and after the
critics expressed by the informants, in third-party certification, power and responsibility lie with
specialised government agencies or private companies without local ties. This system is hierarchical
and leaves producers and consumers without a voice. Technical expertise is valued above empirical,
practical, and regional knowledge, and the stakeholders directly affected by the certification process
are subordinate to intermediaries. In PGS, the stakeholders involved (always those related to food
production, and, in some cases, also those related to food consumption) are responsible for establishing
certification standards. Active participation is a crucial part of PGS membership and helps ensure
the quality assurance process. Even though this approach has more complex requirements that
involve greater time and effort and may come with the challenge of “emotionally” managing the
group (difficulties and challenges related to that point are analysed forward), it is significantly more
transparent and decentralises how certification happens.
The system’s horizontality (when the challenges it entails are surmounted) helps empower
stakeholder communities by promoting farmer self-awareness and self-confidence. The system also
benefits consumers, when they are active partners of the initiative, as they gain more information
and power when it comes to their dietary choices. PGS can thus also help counter “consumer
deskilling” [27], a phenomenon that has important repercussions on the restructuring of agri-food
systems and consumer sovereignty.
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Second, PGS and third-party certification employ very different administrative models, and the
differences extend far beyond the types of forms used. Indeed, the discrepancies in the latter
are influenced by a much more important difference: the identity of those designing the forms.
In third-party certification, generic forms are designed by technical specialists; the same forms are
used by the different countries/regions subject to the overarching regulatory regime. In contrast,
in PGS, producers (and consumers) design the forms, which are tailored to local conditions and
sociocultural context.
Finally, in third-party certification, confidentiality is protected by law. Consequently, no information
regarding the reasons underlying non-compliance are made public. In this system, non-compliance
means the loss of certification and the inability to sell one’s products under the organic label, among
others. In PGS, certification-related information is made publically available and thus there exists
social pressures and control. This system make-up has important consequences given that PGS are
always associated with localised agri-food systems in which: (1) consumers are engaged because of
their concerns over the physical, social, and economic origins of the food they eat [28]; and (2) there
are physical and emotional ties between producers and with consumers [29,30]. Consequently,
non-compliance does not only result in the loss of certification (which is already important), but also
entails the loss of access to local marketing channels and exclusion from the social network established
around the PGS, in the community in which farmers work and live.
6. Are Participatory Guarantee Systems a Viable Alternative to Third-Party Certification?
As we stated at the beginning, PGS have greatly proliferated over recent years, in tandem
with the growth of localised agri-food systems. However, they are not effective in all contexts
and its sustainability is at stake. Regarding our field work, we have identified both external and
internal challenges.
6.1. External Challenges
A significant ideological barrier has been generated by societal distrust of self-management and
the imagined rupture with certification conventions that are assumed to be technically superior. In most
cases, society is reluctant to accept a system based on autonomy and jointly established standards over
a system based on technical expertise, as the latter is considered to be more objective. At work are
also cultural barriers among stakeholders, which are largely influenced by status or profession [31].
As stated in the second PGS meeting, these barriers lead to differences in the perceived trustworthiness
of people’s abilities. People with technical expertise who have trained to work as inspectors are seen as
more trustworthy than producers, who know how to produce food, or critical consumers, who know
what they want to eat. Remarkably, such barriers persist, even in the face of unending food-related
scandals that occur in the food production and marketing chains supposedly controlled by technical
specialists (e.g., the cucumber crisis, the poultry-dioxin affair, and the outbreak of mad cow disease).
However, the proliferation of regulated seals and labels, which are supposedly conferred after technical
inspections, have generated confusion and distrust among consumers [32], which may ultimately
weaken these barriers.
A second external challenge has to do with established power dynamics within agri-food chains.
When PGS are established, in some cases, they have faced fierce lobbying by certifying bodies,
who wield significant governmental power. These bodies view PGS as a threat to their niche market
and use economic and political pressure in their attempts to discredit these groups as well as to prevent
them from being officially recognised or gaining societal acceptance. For example, the international
and Latin American chapters of IFOAM recognise PGS and have created dedicated discussion fora
and meeting spaces for them. They have even created an interactive map that shows the PGS that are
emerging across the globe. In contrast, the European chapter of IFOAM (where certification bodies are
especially present) does not even mention PGS on its website.
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6.2. Internal Challenges
In both of the PGS meetings, participant initiatives stressed that the main internal challenge
faced by the members of a PGS is time requirements. PGS procedures demand a significant time
investment. This fact means that mechanisms for providing a clear return to members must be
developed. For example, the exchanges, learning, improvement, and social networking that take place
need to be explicit and useful. As a result, PGS are not adapted to all contexts nor are they universal
solutions to the certification problem. PGS require a certain degree of militancy and a significant
amount of political involvement. In many cases, key figures can be identified. These people act as
project leaders at certain points in time and assume important responsibilities. They make it possible
for the PGS to move forward and become stronger. Directly related to this, we have identified some
unequal power distribution risks. When the procedure is promoted by one or a few people that have
the time or the resources to dedicate to the PGS, collective action becomes weaker and power relations
evidence a non-horizontal structure. There is an enormous challenge around the difficult balance
of making the PGS operative and active, and allowing the needed time to make it horizontal and
inclusive in the guarantee procedures, the decision making and the assumption of responsibilities.
Another internal challenge is handling disagreements. It can be difficult to express that a member
is not respecting the established standards. Fear of creating open conflict often prevents PGS from
functioning properly. Indeed, shying away from conflict instead of viewing it as an opportunity can
result in frustration and discouragement and, ultimately, kill PGS functionality.
A third element to be considered is related to PGS being based on collective management
principles. However, coming to the required consensus about the specific principles to adopt can
prove difficult. Before establishing their methods for verifying compliance, PGS should clearly define
the criteria and principles to which they wish to adhere, which will inform the set of standards they
establish. This initial step requires a concerted collective effort to determine what PGS members want
and why. This process, which involves negotiation and teamwork, aims to achieve consensus on
general criteria. It requires openness and tolerance on the part of those involved. Part of this process is
clarifying the exact definitions of terms such as quality, proximity, seasonal production, and small-scale
farming. As literature on participatory methodologies has pointed out previously, it is easier to agree
upon general criteria than concrete proposals [33].
Finally, it can be challenging to carry out the farm visits to check for compliance and generate
spaces for learning and exchange. Members shared that they may feel insecure about their ability
to look for and properly identify evidence of non-compliance. This insecurity is attributed to the
common misconception of technical background needed to be competent at these tasks. Usually people
think in technical knowledge provided by universities. Indeed, people seem to undervalue their own
practical experience, which is also technical, and the utility of the questions and concerns raised by
member stakeholders who bring to bear important ideological convictions. For example, producers
and consumers can complement each other during visits: the former can shed light on more technical
aspects of the production process, while the latter may be more attuned to issues related to water use,
energy use, and waste disposal.
The main difficulties encountered by PGS are the suite of tasks that are usually outsourced in
third-party certification. Indeed, the certifying body becomes the one that assumes the necessary time
investment and that takes on the burden of resolving conflicts and conducting inspections. In contrast,
PGS change the power and market structures that have been established by official regulations. They
question the idea that third-party certification is the only valid mechanism for ensuring quality in
agri-food systems. This shift in certification-related responsibilities implies an alternative vision of
food and farming, one in which food is a “commons” rather than a politicised “commodity” associated
with differential rights [34]. Such proposed changes fit within the social framework of what Lozano
and Gómez Benito [35] have identified as food citizenship, whereby everyday citizens participate
in the governance of food systems, whether by producing food, making food consumption choices,
or both.
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7. The Important Implications of the Politics behind Organic Certification: Procedures Matters
After what has been analysed, we can affirm that PGS are tools that are consistent with
alternative modes of conceiving and organising food systems, which are referred to as “alternative
food networks”, “short food supply chains”, or “local food systems” [36]. Conversely, it has also
been commonly invoked as “food citizenship”, “food democracy”, and “civic food networks” [37].
PGS represent a radical change from neoliberal food systems, which are described as “corporate” [38]
or “financialized” [39], from the perspective of their modes of production, the resulting food systems,
and the mechanisms used to ensure compliance with autonomously defined standards. PGS are
consistent with the idea of re-localising and re-socialising the concept of the food system [40],
as expressed by Schermer [41] via the notion of “food from somewhere”. PGS establish trust in
local food systems and refer to goals of autonomy and empowerment. Indeed, this new approach
was first developed in 1996 as a result of proposed food sovereignty policies [42], driven by the
Via Campesina international movement (cf. [38,43]).
PGS thus are distant from the trend in the responsible consumption movement toward ever
more numerous seals and labels (from both public and private sources) and instead espouse
certain definitions of food quality. These signs of food characteristics—which include not only
the regulation-based organic label, but also private-sector markers such as appellations of origin,
the GlobalG.A.P. label, the Rainforest Alliance seal, or the Fairtrade (FLO) mark—are granted according
to sets of standards that are defined by different stakeholders with varying degrees of democracy [44].
PGS represent a major change regarding this tendency to focus the agri-food system in the local
context, where consumers, as well as producers, have a voice to make decisions about the food they
want to have. Thus, they play a far greater role in agricultural postproduction than do the organisms
responsible for such labels and seals [45]. Indeed, they represent a significant change in regulatory
systems because they give voice to consumers and producers to define food quality, that is, they embed
all the agri-food system in local communities.
The ability of PGS to build trust is also associated with the idea of food “commons”. In the case
of PGS, we propose that quality assurance is the common feature upon which the collaboratively
established processes are built. They provide an efficacious alternative in a market characterised by
individuation and neoliberalism [46], of which third-party certification is a manifestation. Here, we are
not using Ostrom’s definition of “commons”, which focuses on institutional economics and identifies
“commons” as natural resources that are managed by small communities according to clearly defined
principles. In that context, the food “commons” are goods. Instead, the food “commons” discussed
here are the methods for ensuring food quality within localised production systems, which arises
from the specific needs of the social group that builds the PGS and which is implemented via the
politicization of the satisfiers (under a Max Neef perspective) [47]. A mechanism is established that
bolsters satisfier self-management by strengthening the social ties of concerned stakeholders within
specific localised areas. Indeed, this approach does not seek to appropriate the services developed
within a framework of commercial and individualistic concerns.
The regional groups that have built PGS within the EU are not following official regulations.
Instead, they subscribe to an alternative system that is not officially recognised and assume the
consequences. PGS do not correspond to either of the movement types defined by Friedmann and
MacNair [48]: (1) movements that adopt constructive, non-confrontational strategies with regards to
the powers that be (i.e., governmental institutions and for-profit corporations); and (2) movements that
adopt radical, combative strategies. PGS do not seek to either inform or fight government regulations
and/or official systems of governance. Their strategy is build autonomy, and they assume the resulting
costs and disadvantages. Indeed, in the various communication fora used by PGS (cf. [49] (pp. 2–3)),
as well as in the first Spanish PGS meeting, it is been stated that official recognition of PGS can lead to
more disadvantages than advantages, based on the experience of Brazilian and Mexican groups.
Such verification invites us to affirm that the regulations a society establishes are not neutral.
They are framed by a specific perspective on the role of public institutions, private stakeholders,
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and civil society. When establishing regulations such as those governing the organic sector, policy
choices have important implications. Society can choose either an approach that strengthens the
tendency towards globalization and that bolsters international markets via the adoption of common
technical rules or an approach that favours local initiatives emerging from the needs and interests of
local stakeholders. These decisions are not made based on economic/societal concerns or on in-depth
analyses, but rather arise from cognitive systems or systems of reference, which inform not only
practices (cf. [50]) but also government regulations. Regulations in the organic sector are the product
of conventional cognitive systems, which have established mandatory mechanisms that significantly
impact the sector’s development. The coexistence of the two types of approaches has not been taken
into account in any of the organic regulations discussed and approved until now.
In this sense, discussion regarding organic sector conventionalisation has been centred on
the definition and adoption of certain standards [50,51]. Here, we are interested in stressing the
importance and relevance of the different possible governance systems in this conventionalisation
process. The principles upon which a system is based will strengthen certain tendencies versus
others. In other words, results will be different depending on whether a system is rooted in:
(1) a production-based paradigm that promotes international trade and globalised agri-food systems
and that thus adopts commonly shared international standards and procedures that are determined
by government regulations and technical bodies; or (2) principles such as food sovereignty and
food democracy [10]. This will be very conditioned by who and how decisions are taken regarding
agri-food systems.
PGS are based on a system of reference that is highly dissimilar from the hegemonic system.
They represent a new framework that is inspired by other cognitive systems. They view resource
management and productivity differently; favour a more holistic worldview and foster the interaction
between different forms of knowledge, including traditional knowledge, as well as creation and
implementation of knowledge within specific contexts; and operate on a value-weighted scale where
emphasis is placed on factors such as equity, solidarity and justice. Overall, procedures are rooted in the
principles of radical democracy. This enormous shift brings one of their main limits: the development
of a very political and critical approach is required to a group of producers (and consumers, when they
get implied) to develop such governance system.
8. General Conclusions
The proliferation of Participatory Guarantee Systems across the globe and particularly in places
where they are not officially recognised as systems for certifying organic production is encouraging
debate on certification mechanisms in agri-food systems.
The social groups and networks associated with PGS render visible the implications of using
a technical approach to regulate the organic sector. By questioning whether third-party certification
is the only way to ensure food quality, PGS are drawing greater attention to the political and social
processes by which sectors are certified. It is more than just a matter of whether or not a technical
approach should be used. Indeed, PGS propose a different vision of the relationship within food
systems, a vision of their territorial embeddedness, and a different governance model to handle
their functioning.
PGS use quality assurance procedures that politically confront third-party certification. Trust is
viewed as emerging from social dialogue, and radical democracy determines decision-making and
capacity building. Horizontality is used to facilitate discussion among producers and, in some cases,
to engage consumers as well. In this vision, agri-food systems are closely tied to specific regions. To be
effective, PGS must engage in community building, and their members must have organizational and
technical skills. The ultimate result, when all these conditions are attended, is group empowerment.
However, these characteristics—which allow the creation and growth of PGS at the local
level—also present major challenges. To function properly, a PGS requires time, effort, and community
building. In current agri-food systems, certifying bodies assume these responsibilities, which makes
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them easier for producers, but rather implies an individualist and undemocratic agri-food logic.
However, PGS have to deal with disagreements and conflict resolution, which are natural results of
the collective effort. It is not surprising that PGS fit well within political social frameworks that view
food as a common good and confidence building as a common itself. Otherwise, PGS implementation
is rather difficult, and we believe that they cannot be used in situations in which stakeholders are not
involved in methodological development and implementation.
Author Contributions: Mamen Cuéllar-Padilla has designed the research, performed it and analyzed the data.
Wrote the main part of the paper. Has read and approve the final manuscript. Ernesto Ganuza has contributed to
the discussion about the research design, the results and the paper structure. He contributed revising the different
versions of the manuscript and completing some of the paragraphs. He has read and approve the final manuscript.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
References
1. Zuckerman, A. European standards officials push reform of ISO 9000 and QS-9000 registration. Qual. Prog.
1996, 29, 131–134.
2. Tanner, B. Independent assessment by third-party certification bodies. Food Control 2000, 11, 415–417.
[CrossRef]
3. Golan, E.; Kuchler, F.; Mitchell, L.; Greene, C.; Jessup, A. Economics of food labeling. J. Consum. Policy 2001,
24, 117–184. [CrossRef]
4. Stoker, G. Governance as theory: Five propositions. Int. Soc. Sci. J. 1998, 50, 17–28. [CrossRef]
5. Barrientos, S.; Dolan, C.; Tallontire, A. Gender and Ethical Trade: A Mapping of the Issues in African Horticulture;
Department for International Development: London, UK, 2001.
6. Bredahl, M.E.; Northen, J.R.; Boecker, A.; Normile, M.A. Consumer Demand Sparks the Growth of Quality
Assurance Schemes in the European Food Sector. Changing Structure of Global Food Consumption and Trade;
WRS-01-1; Economic Record Service/USDA: New York, NY, USA, 2001.
7. Calvin, L.; Cook, R.; Denbaly, M.; Dimitri, C.; Glaser, L.; Handy, C.; Jekanowski, M.; Kaufman, P.; Krissoff, B.;
Thompson, G.; et al. US Fresh Fruit and Vegetable Marketing: Emerging Trade Practices, Trends, and Issues;
Agricultural Economic Report No. (AER795); Economic Research Service/USDA Economic Research
Service/USDA: Washington, DC, USA, 2001.
8. Sylvander, B. Le rôle de la certification dans les changements de régimes de coordination: l’Agriculture
Biologique, du réseau à l’industrie. Revue d’Économie Industrielle 1998, 80, 47–66. [CrossRef]
9. Meirelles, L. La Certificación de Productos Orgánicos, Caminos y Descaminos; Centro Agroecológico Litoral Norte:
Ipe-Serra, Brasil, 2004.
10. Cuéllar-Padilla, M.; Calle, A. Can We Find Solutions With People? Participatory Action Research with Small
Organic Producers In Andalusia. J. Rural Stud. 2011, 27, 372–383. [CrossRef]
11. Roure, K. (Ed.) Les Systèmes de Garantie Participatifs, pour l’Agriculture Biologique Associative et Solidaire;
Nature & Progrès Editions: Uzès, France, 2007.
12. Lamine, C.; Bellon, S. Transitions vers l’Agriculture Biologique; Quaie y Educagri Editions: Paris, France, 2009;
ISBN 2904738266.
13. Guzmán-Casado, G.; López-García, D.; Román, L.; Alonso, A. Participatory Action Research in Agroecology:
Building Local Organic Food Networks in Spain. J. Sustain. Agric. 2012, 37, 127–146.
14. Calle, A.; Vara-Sánchez, I.; Cuéllar-Padilla, M. La Transición social Agroecológica. In Procesos hacia la Soberanía
Alimentaria. Perspectivas y Prácticas desde la Agroecología Política; Cuéllar-Padilla, M., Calle-Collado, A.,
Gallar-Hernández, D., Eds.; Editorial Icaria: Barcelona, Spain, 2013; pp. 81–102. ISBN 9788498884531.
15. Willer, H.; Lernoud, J. The World of Organic Agriculture. Statistics and Emerging Trends 2015; FiBL, Frick and
IFOAM—Organics International: Bonn, Germany, 2015.
16. IFOAM. Sistemas de Garantía Participativos. Visión Compartida, Ideales Compartidos; IFOAM: Bonn, Germany, 2008.
17. Fonseca, M.F. Alternative certification and a network conformity assessment approach. Org. Stand. 2004,
38, 3–7.
18. Guthman, J. Commodified Meanings, Meaningful Commodities: Re–thinking Production–Consumption
Links through the Organic System of Provision. Sociol. Rural. 2002, 42, 295–311. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2018, 10, 1142 14 of 15
19. Guthman, J. The Trouble with ‘Organic Lite’ in California: A Rejoinder to the ‘Conventionalisation’ Debate.
Sociol. Rural. 2004, 44, 301–316. [CrossRef]
20. Nelson, E.; Gómez Tovar, L.; Schwentesius Rindermann, R.; Gómez Cruz, M.A. Participatory organic
certification in Mexico: An alternative approach to maintaining the integrity of the organic label.
Agric. Hum. Values 2010, 27, 227–237. [CrossRef]
21. May, C. PGS Guidelines. How Participatory Guarantee Systems Can Develop and Function; IFOAM: Bonn,
Germany, 2008.
22. IFOAM. The Global PGS Newsletter, November/December 2013; IFOAM: Bonn, Germany, 2013. Available online:
https://www.ifoam.bio/sites/default/files/_pgs_nov_dec_2012.pdf (accessed on 2 February 2018).
23. Nelson, E.; Gómez Tovar, L.; Gueguen, E.; Humphries, S.; Landman, K.; Schwentesius Rindermann, R.
Participatory guarantee systems and the re-imagining of Mexico’s organic sector. Agric. Hum. Values 2015,
33, 373–388. [CrossRef]
24. Radomsky, G. Certificações, Sistemas Participativos de Garantia e Agricultura Ecológica: Aspectos da
relação entre agricultores e consumidores. In Agroecologia: Práticas, Mercados e Políticas para uma nova
Agricultura; Niederle, P., de Almeida, L., Vezzani, F., Eds.; Kairós: Curitiba, Brasil, 2013; pp. 297–326.
ISBN 978-85-63806-16-1.
25. Passos, M.; Isaguirre-Torres, K. Certificação na prática: A Rede Ecovida e os desafios da implementação
de Sistemas Participativos de Garantia. In Agroecologia: Práticas, Mercados e Políticas para uma nova
Agricultura; Niederle, P., de Almeida, L., Vezzani, F., Eds.; Kairós: Curitiba, Brasil, 2013; pp. 327–363.
ISBN 978-85-63806-16-1.
26. Sevilla-Guzmán, E.; Soler, M.; Gallar, D.; Vara, I.; Calle, A. Canales Cortos de Comercialización en Andalucía;
Fundación Pública Andaluza Centro de Estudios Andaluces, Consejería de la Presidencia e igualdad,
Junta de Andalucía: Sevilla, Spain, 2012.
27. Jaffe, J.; Gertler, M. Victual Vicissitudes: Consumer Deskilling and the (Gendered) Transformation of Food
Systems. Agric. Hum. Values 2006, 23, 143–162. [CrossRef]
28. EIP AGRI Focus Group. Innovative Short Food Supply Chain Chains Management; Final Report; European
Commission: Brussels, Belgium, 2015. Available online: https://ec.europa.eu/eip/agriculture/sites/agri-
eip/files/eip-agri_fg_innovative_food_supply_chain_management_final_report_2015_en.pdf (accessed on
15 June 2016).
29. Ilbery, B.; Maye, D. Food supply chains and sustainability: Evidence from specialist food producers in the
Scottish/English border. Land Use Policy 2005, 22, 331–344. [CrossRef]
30. Renting, H.; Marsden, T.K.; Banks, J. Understanding alternative food networks: Exploring the role of short
supply chains in rural development. Environ. Plan. 2003, 35, 393–412. [CrossRef]
31. Olitsky, S. Crossing the Boundaries: Solidarity, Identity, and Mutual Learning in a K-20 Partnership. Sci. Educ.
2017, 101, 399–425. [CrossRef]
32. Moon, S.; Costello, J.; Koo, D. The impact of consumer confusion from eco-labels on negative WOM, distrust,
and dissatisfaction. Int. J. Advert. 2017, 36, 246–271. [CrossRef]
33. Vivero-Pol, J.L. Food as Commons or Commodity? Exploring the Links between Normative Valuations and
Agency in Food Transition. Sustainability 2017, 9, 442. [CrossRef]
34. Ganuza, E.; Olivari, L.; Paño, P.; Buitrago, L.; Lorenzana, C. La Democracia en Acción. Una Visión desde las
Metodologías Participativas; Antigona: Cordoba, Spain, 2011.
35. Lozano-Cabedo, C.; Gomez-Benito, C. A Theoretical Model of Food Citizenship for the Analysis of Social
Praxis. J. Agric. Environ. Ethics 2017, 30, 1–22. [CrossRef]
36. Tregear, A. Progressing knowledge in alternative and local food networks: Critical reflections and a research
agenda. J. Rural Stud. 2011, 27, 419–430. [CrossRef]
37. Renting, H.; Schermer, M.; Rossi, A. Building food democracy: Exploring civic food networks and newly
emerging forms of food citizenship. Int. J. Sociol. Agric. Food 2012, 19, 289–307.
38. McMichael, P. A food regime genealogy. J. Peasant Stud. 2009, 36, 139–169. [CrossRef]
39. Burch, D.; Lawrence, G. Supermarket own brands supply chains and the transformation of the Agri-Food
System. Int. J. Sociol. Agric. Food 2005, 13, 1–28.
40. Marsden, T.; Banks, J.; Bristow, G. Food supply chain approaches: Exploring their role in rural development.
Sociol. Rural. 2000, 40, 424–438. [CrossRef]
Sustainability 2018, 10, 1142 15 of 15
41. Schermer, M. From “Food from Nowhere” to “Food from Here”: Changing producer–consumer relations in
Austria. Agric. Hum. Values 2015, 32, 121–132. [CrossRef]
42. Cuéllar-Padilla, M.; Calle-Collado, A.; Gallar-Hernandez, D. Procesos hacia la Soberanía Alimentaria; Icaria:
Barcelona, Spain, 2013; ISBN 9788498884531.
43. Desmarais, A. La Vía Campesina. La Globalización y el poder del Campesinado; Editorial Popular: Madrid,
Spain, 2007; ISBN 9788478843855.
44. Cuéllar-Padilla, M.; Reintjes, C. Los Sellos y Sistemas de Garantía para el Comercio Justo; Editorial Icaria:
Barcelona, Spain, 2009; ISBN 978-84-9888-093-9.
45. Campbell, H. Breaking new ground in food regime theory: Corporate environmentalism, ecological
feedbacks and the ‘food from somewhere’ regime? Agric. Hum. Values 2009, 26, 309–319. [CrossRef]
46. Bowen, S.; Mutersbaugh, T. Local or localized? Exploring the contributions of Franco-Mediterranean agrifood
theory to alternative food research. Agric. Hum. Values 2014, 31, 201–213. [CrossRef]
47. Neef, M. Desarrollo a escala Humana; Nordam Comunidad: Montevideo, Uruguay, 1998; ISBN 84-7426-217-8.
48. Friedmann, H.; McNair, A. Whose rules rule? Contested projects to certify ‘local production for distant
consumers’. J. Agrar. Chang. 2008, 8, 408–434. [CrossRef]
49. IFOAM. The Global PGS Newsletter, November/December 2014; IFOAM: Bonn, Germany, 2014. Available online:
https://www.ifoam.bio/sites/default/files/pgs_newsletter_11_12_2014.pdf (accessed on 2 February 2018).
50. Stassart, P.; Jamar, D. Agriculture biologique et verrouillage des systèmes de connaissances.
Conventionalisation des filières agroalimentaire bio. Innov. Agron. 2009, 4, 313–328. [CrossRef]
51. Jaffe, D.; Howard, P. Corporate cooptation of organic and fair trade standards. Agric. Hum. Values 2009,
27, 387–399. [CrossRef]
© 2018 by the authors. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access
article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution
(CC BY) license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
